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9. M U RRAY : FAITHFUL TO 
TRADITION IN CONTEXT 
Thomas Hughson, S.J. 
Catholics and other Christians most likely know John Courtney Murray 
as a protagonist in the production of the Declaration on ReHgious Free-
dom at the Second Vatican Council, published almost forty years ago. 
Its significance for the public Jjfe of Catholicism in religiously pluralist 
societies remruns hard to overestimate. Social ethics, fundamental the-
ology, practical theology, public theology, and communications are 
theological specialties that also have found substance in his writings. 
Murray's thought on the twin topics that preoccupied so much of 
rus reflection, Church-state relation and religious liberty, might seem 
defined by ties to his native land, the United States, and its charter doc-
uments to which he appealed, the Declaration of Independence, the 
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. Still, the Catholic breadth of his 
vision is indicated by his study at the Gregorian University in Rome in 
the late 1930s while a young Jesuit, his academic sojourn in Germany, 
his dissertation on Matthias Scheeben's doctrine on faith in 1937, his 
continual reading of history, his attention to World War II and interna-
tional affairs, his participation in post-World War U assistance to Ger-
man reconstruction, his career-long interest in ecumenical and 
interreligious cooperation for the social common good, and his aware-
ness of Hrruts and defects in the culture of the United States. 
.. 
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In the 1940s and into the 1950s some public Protestant doubt circu-
lated on why and how deeply their Catholic fellow citizens endorsed 
what many regarded as a signal novelty and essential· institution in the 
democratic structures of the United States-the First Amendment guar-
antee of free exercise and qf the nonestablishment of religion. No 
doubts accompanied the Protestant observation that Catholics in prac-
tice supported nonestablishment and religious freedom. The question 
remained, was that practice princ ipled? Or was it an expedient adjust-
ment to national facts Catholics wished were otherwise, and which they 
might seek to change if they became numerous enough ? Might Catho-
lics be harboring reservations about the First Amendment clauses out of 
a deeper preference for an established Catholicism that papal teaching 
recommended as best? This was a question about Catholic thought, 
principle, and theory, not about practice. It was an impertinent question 
for families whose children had perished in military service under an 
oath to uphold the Constitution, but it needed an answer, and an answer 
in the realm of theory. 
In response, starting in the mid-1940s, Murray launched an almost 
career-long inquiry into religious freedom and Church-state relations. 
The two topics are indissociable. Rebgious freedom in any society 
flourishes or does not according to the political organization of society; 
the state possesses a monopoly on legitimate use ·of coercive force in 
society, and the . government exercises it. Religious freedom depends 
for protection, or suffers abuse, depending on the manner and scope of 
that governmental exercise of power. 
Unfortunately, Catholics in the United States were not lacking a few 
writers who championed the thesis/hypothesis theory propounded as 
Catholic doctrine by, among others, Vatican Secretary of the Holy Of-
fice Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani . His vie w lifted up national establish-
ment of the Catholic Church as the ideal or thesis, and relegated 
anything else, such as the United States arrangement, to the i~ferior 
status of being merely a hypothesis. 
By the time Pope John XXIII convoked Vatican II, Murray had be-
come the foremost American Catholic theorist on rel igious liberty. 
Murray had entered into controversy in national public life in defense 
of government aid to Catholic schools as well as by arguing for recov-
ery of a " public philosophy" of natural Jaw truths and values. Before 
the 1960 presidential election, the Kennedy campaign staff consulted 
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hjm on Church-state relations prior to a famous speech Kennedy deliv-
ered to ministers in Houston, Texas, which was intended to help set 
aside fears that a Catholic in the White House would mean a pope tele-
phoning instructions to guide presidential decisions. A short time after 
Kennedy ' s victory, on December 12, 1960, Time magazine featured 
Murray on its cover. 
At Vatican U, Murray was appointed "first scribe" in the comrrus-
sion charged with produc ing a text on religious liberty. This gave him 
an important role in shaping the document without his being the single 
architect. The final document promulgated on December 7, 1965, above 
the signatures of Paul VI and the assembled bishops, had undergone 
significant change since its inception. In the commission Murray had 
steadily argued through five drafts that religious liberty was best under-
stood as primarily a political and legal reality that owed its existence to 
modern consciousness and insti tu tions, not directly to Church initia-
tives. Affirming religious liberty by declaring official Catholic approval 
of an already familiar idea, practice, and set of institutions was a belated 
aggiornamento, not a groundbreaking development. Modesty, even a 
little chagrin not triumphal ism, was appropriate in view of post-Trident-
ine Church-state relationships in the area of religious liberty. 
Murray had long he ld that prior centuries, during which the gospel 
exercised a leavenjng influence in western political self-understandings 
and practices, provided a basis for a modern consciousness of human 
dignity and the legal institutions designed to protect its realization in 
practice. Well versed in the historical record of protracted conflicts be-
tween Church authorities and political leaders from Constantine on, he 
also pointed out repeated assertions of papal independence in judgment 
and ministry. The mustard seed of post-Constantinian papal defense of 
the libertas ecclesiae (freedom of the Church) became a tree of faith 
sheltering both civil society and the eventual emergence of demands for 
individual freedom in religion. 
That tree had sometimes been shaken, as with Innocent Ill , who 
crowded out political authority on the premise that all temporal as well 
as spirit~al power passed from Jesus to Peter to popes, and on that foun-
dation he believed that popes rightly seated and unseated emperors and 
kings. The ancient dualism of Pope Gelasius had not been forgotten, 
however. In A.D. 494, Gelasius wrote to Emperor Anastasios 1: "Two 
there are, august Emperor, but which this world is ruled on the title of 
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original and sovereign right- the consecrated authority of the priest-
hood and the royal power." Recalling this vision was Leo XIII 's 
achievement and to develop it was Murray's continuing task. This dual-
ism was, Murray agreed; the major impact o.f Christianity on political 
life, and applied Jesus' God/Caesar difference. 
On the basis of this dia;chy, Murray recognized the legitimacy of 
royal claims to independence from ecclesiastical jurisdiction in political 
judgment and action. His views increasingly foUowed Thomas Aquinas 
and John of Paris on the natural law, temporal purposes of the political 
structures in any society. He came to disagree with Robert BeJiarmine's 
proposal that in religious emergencies, not as a regular matter, a pope 
could temporarily exercise authority over a political area for a good 
spiritual end. This limit purified the exercise of apostolic jurisdiction 
wi thout infringing on the duty to teach the gospel. Contrarily, even if 
requested by a pope or bishop on behalf of a society's spiritual welfare, 
any governmental repression of heresies prec isely as religious doctrines 
and practices overstepped the bounds of pol itical authority, though a 
state always had a duty toward public order, safety, and civil morality. 
Murray assimilated the nineteenth-century papacy's critique of the 
supremacy of the individual reason (continental liberalism), especially 
when writ large as a nation-state 's supreme authority in all zones of 
socia l existence (totalitarianism). Consequently he contrasted the 
Anglo-American tradition of constitutional gove~ment (which he con-
sidered unknown to Leo Xlll) , including the United States constitu-
tional provisions of nonestablishment and re ligious liberty, to 
continental state absolutism (which Leo knew from the French Revolu-
tion and its aftermath). He argued that medieval recognition that the 
consent of the governed belonged to the legitimacy of political author-
ity passed to the founding of the United States, not through the Catholic 
nations of continental Europe, but through England, where the Magna 
Carta in 12 15 initiated a long train of curtailments to monarchical 
power. The concept of a divine right, absolute monarch in Europe was 
a bad idea with demonstrably negative consequences. Governa nce 
under a constitution was' a much better political idea because govern-
mental exerc ise of power was submitted to the rule of known public 
law. It Was more congruent with Gelasian dualism than was, for exam-
ple, L'etat c'est moi. 
Murray focused to a surprising extent on what today would be called 
political culture and civil society, not solely on laws, structures, and the 
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technical procedures of democracy. In fact, the theoretical and opera-
tional priority of society over the state was both a cardinal emphasis in 
Catholic social teaching and was the hallmark of resistance to totalitari-
anism of the right or left. Simply put, the state and government existed 
for the good of society and the people·, not the other way around. States 
and governments, however, have a momentum of their own that tends 
to reverse this. Nor do I think Murray would have expected that a de-
mocracy would spring up like a mushroom, in Russia for example, if 
only a stone of oppressive state fascism were removed. A functional 
civil society is a more substantial prerequisite for democracy than a 
warehouse fi lled with voting booths. 
Moreover, Murray's understanding of civil society and political cul-
ture was thoroughly historical. He stated that, " the Bill of Rights is not 
a piece of eighteenth-century rationalist theory; it is far more the prod-
uct of Christian history." Behind it lay not John Locke's books so much 
as a lengthy British progress toward the commonly accepted " rights of 
an Englishman." And underpinning that progress were people who had 
learned their human dignity "in the schoof of Christian faith," and a 
political culture that developed and applied the principle of the consent 
of the governed under a rule of law. 
In that light, free exercise of re ligion is a public, social conditio'n 
dependent on a state respecting the limits of its authority, which is to 
say that this authority is nonex istent in regard to religion. Historical 
arrival at this position depends on a prior affirmation of human dignity 
and on some manner of religion-state dualism. On the dualist premise, 
political governance for Christians-and perhaps unlike Church or reli-
gious authority in a non-Christian re ligion- has no authority from the 
Creator to define or decide religious belief, practice, or institutional ex-
istence, though it must see to public safety, order, and morality. In the 
founding of the United States, for example, it was not the religion 
clauses in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights that anchored pro-
tection for liberty of religion. The clauses simply made explicit the civil 
liberties of individuals in a limited state with enumerated powers. Au-
thority to establish religion or prevent its free exercise was not on the 
list of powers. The Constitution already, before the Bill of Rights, had 
eliminated establishment and assured free exercise. 
Keeping in mind the formative English history behind the Constitu-
tion leads us to a realization that some form of widespread education 
accessible to a people, rather than simply elections, is the first step in 
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formjng a democratic state. In trying to support democracies around the 
world, Western powers may look too much to elections, written laws, 
and a wi ll ingness to compromjse, while scanting the essential roles of 
education, political culture, and formation in human .dignity. Likewise, 
human rights monitors attending to freedom of religion hopefully at-
tend carefully to a people's whole everyday way of life and their culture 
rather than only to written statutes. De facto conditions, not simply de 
jure documentation, need to weigh heavily in any plans to form or sup-
port democracy. Murray emphasized that the founding of the United 
States was not according to a preconceived, doctrinaire plan. 
An alternative perspective argued within the Vatican II preparatory 
commission focu sed on individual human rights. This view of the 
human and civil right to religious liberty revolves around individual 
human rights, and around the freedom of individual conscience, or in 
the Catholic version, the dignity of the human person that grounds the 
" rights of man." Once the conciliar text embraced the principle, it had 
to balance it with a teachjng that the innate obligatjon to the truth, not 
arbitrary personal preference, formed personal freedom of conscience 
and religion. Murray fell ill and was hospitalized during the final re-
write of the document. So in the final text the " individual" argument 
assumed a larger role than it would have if Murray had been active. He 
saluted its publication with two cheers, not three. 
Murray upheld, of course, freedom of conscience and the dignity of 
the person as essential to civil society. Christian· freedom was some-
thing more. It had a communal aspect, and sprang from the new human 
situation due to Christ, the gospel, and the Holy Spirit. It flourished 
insofar as Christians opened themselves to the leading of God, and is-
sued in zeal for the gospel. It also pertained to life inside the Church. 
After the Council, Murray commented that Vatican II moved the 
Church out of a post-Tridentine configuration in regard to Christian 
freedom. Four centuries of understandable pastoral reaction to rejec-
tions of ecclesiastical authority, first by the Reformation and then by 
the Enlightenment, amounted to hypertrophy of the principle of author-
ity, with a correlatjve atrophy of the principle of freedom in the Church. 
Conciliar renewal reaffirmed Christian freedom. 
But in civil society Murray thought protection for free exercise of 
religion came first and foremost from circumscribing state authority 
within due bounds, not from asserting individual freedoms. The text 
voted by the bishops and signed by Pope Paul VI, nonetheless, offers 
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more common ground with Protestant understandings of religious free-
dom, and so better serves the ecumenical goal of the Council. Murray's 
approach remains a sign of Catholic understanding that social and polit-
ical dimensions are internal to perso_nal liberty, not added on from out-
side to a purely individual or private reality. 
Two DRAM AS 
Was the contest between alternative views of religious liberty within the 
drafting commission the central drama of Murray's theological career? 
Probably not. True, all his previous research and reflection indeed came 
into play-the stakes were high, the differences real, the arguments 
sharp. But the commission was, after a ll, collaborative if s trenuous. 
Any conflict was subordinate to a common purpose. There were, how-
ever, two conflicts in Murray's li fe as a theologian that do qualify as 
major dramas. Both arose from the fact that Catholicism in the United 
States has had a quality of originality that American Protestants and 
European Catholics alike had a hard time locating. Drama involves a 
main character contending with inescapable tensions, an apex of con-
fli ct, and a denouement. 
The Protestant/Catholic drama in the United States was a set of ten-
sions between an immigrant Catholicism gaining its place after World 
War n and a culturally regnant Protestant ethos gradually coming to 
terms with religious pluralism. Many Protestants still saw Catho lics in 
the United States as the local presence of European Catholicism. They 
had read Leo Xfll 's fulminations against re ligious liberty and Church-
state separation, had observed Vatican policy in making Church-state 
concordats, and saw how Spain was taken by Rome to exemplify the 
establishment wanted by the Church. Murray's extensive writing on 
Church-state matters was a prolonged demonstration that the Church's 
actions, policies, and theories in Church-state relations had historically 
contingent elements. So me in the Church, highly placed at that, mis-
took post-Reformation, post-wars of re ligion alliances with confes-
sional states as an immediate consequence of Catholic faith, treating 
Spain as if universally normative. Catholicism in the United States had 
never wanted establ ishment. Doubts about American Catholics were 
unfounded. His inte rest ~as in citizens of all religions cooperating for 
the common good and for the intellectual empowerment of Catholics to 
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pick up their share of active citizenship in a religiously pluralist 
democracy. 
Murray's best-known b.ook, the preconcitiar We H,old These Truths: 
Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition ( 1960) capped a the-
oretical explanation of how and why Catholics consented to the Ameri-
can experiment in full fidelitY to Catholic principles. 1 At the basis was 
a theory of Church-state relations summed up in four principles. The 
first principle was the irreducible difference in origin, activity, and end 
of Church and state. The second principle was the effective spiritual 
primacy of the Church and faith in relations with the political order. 
The third principle was the integrity of the political order and its inde-
pendence from ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The fourth principle affirmed 
the immanent finality of Church and state to some manner of harmony 
for the sake of those who belong to both simultaneously. Much of Mur-
ray's work concentrated on the third principle, which he took to be a 
valid modem differentiation between sacred and secular. He understood 
this to be true to Catholic tradition on Church and state and more partic-
ularly to Leo Xlll's development of it. 
The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 seemed to have settled in 
practice what Murray had demonstrated in theory. It drew the Protes-
tant/Catholic drama in the United States to its last act. The Catholic 
faith, the outcome of the election showed, did no~ preclude a Catholic 
citizen from becoming president. Kennedy' s executive prowess showed 
it did not entail submission to the authority of the pope as temporal 
ruler, as if American Catholics were subjects in the former papal states. 
Finally, though, it was the 1965 Declaration on Ecumenism that re-
moved the underlying premise for the post-Reformation, Protestant/ 
Catholic drama in every nation, at least from the Catholic side. The 
older premise, that Protestant and Catholic were first of all antagonists 
over Christian truth, became awareness that what we have in common 
is greater than what divides us. The ecumenical movement, among 
Protestants who accept ~~umenism, the Orthodox, and CatholiCs, has 
resolved the Protestant/Catholic drama in which Murray played a part. 
Subsequently, the 2004 debate over another Catholic citizen's electoral 
campaign in the United States advises that the Protestant/Catholic 
drama has ceded to "culture wars" within the Catholic Church, as well 
as among Protestant and Orthodox Americans. Murray's theory of civil 
dialogue has much to offer this condition too. 
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There was a second drama in Murray's theological life. Another set 
of tensions sprang up between Murray and the dominant school of 
thought on Church-state relations that had representatives in Rome and 
in the United States. This was a tradition/modernity conflict. It played 
out through conflict, resolution, and denouement in Murray's relations 
with the Vatican. His book We Hold These Truths followed painful ten-
sion with Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, Vatican Secretary of the Holy Of-
fice (now the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith), who 
published and acted on a Church-state theory of tolerant establishment 
where a predominantly Catholic population made this feasible, as it did 
in Spain. The tragic climax was the si lencing of Murray by his religious 
superiors on the Church-state topic in 1954. Behind this lay a back-
ground of European Catholic difficulty in grasping that Catholics in the 
United States, a mission country, were actually Catholic but incultura-
ted in a different way. Many in Catholic Europe had seen the United 
States as a Protestant nation, American Catholics as quasi-Protestant, 
and the pairing of religious liberty with n~nestablishment as contrary 
to Catholic tradition. 
In response, Murray pointed to the historical contingency of the 
post-Reformation confessional state in order to remove its ostensible 
status as an arrangement that Catholic doctrines demanded as a neces-
sary consequence of their truth. What the state owed the Church was 
not establishment but protection of its citizens' religious liberty, so the 
Church could flourish from its own native energies apart from state co-
ercion. Murray distinguished Anglo-American constitutionalism from 
what Leo XIII had learned about and condemned in democracy carried 
by the French Revolution and its aftermath. 
A lesser-known book by Murray, The Problem of Religious Free-
dom, made the case at Vatican II that conciliar development beyond 
Leo's gravamen against religious liberty and Church-state separation 
was possible because in historical context Leo inveighed only against 
certain kinds of nineteenth-century, continental instantiations of these, 
not all possible versions.2 That Murray's view on this carried the day, 
that he was a peritus at Vatican II in the firs t place, that he had a sig-
nificant hand in drafting the Decree on Religious Liberty, and that he 
received a special blessing from Paul VI, resolved the conflict with Ot-
taviani. Notable is the fact that Leo XIII, Catholic social teaching after 
him, Murray, and Vatican II , all have taken their bearing on political 
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life from Aquinas rather than Augustine's City of God. This poses a 
challenge to neo-Augustinian social theologies. 
.. 
CONCLUDI NG R EFLECTION 
In a monarchy o r nondemocratic state, relations between Church and 
state occur insofar as legitimate authorities representing each " perfect 
society" meet and conduct business together. Church and state con-
vened in meetings, or in re lationships carried out according to formal, 
legal arrangements between popes and emperors, popes and kings, 
bishops and princes, cle rgy and magistrates. Leo broug ht forward rec-
ognition that such relationships were not for the sake of authori ties 
themselves, o r o nly for the dignity of the offices they occupied, bu t 
above all for the sake of peoples beneath them. The civis idem et chris-
tianus, the citizen (or subject) who was both under state and Church 
authority, had duties to fulfi ll in both societies. If Church and state au-
thorities were at odds to the extent that they commanded opposite acts, 
the effect was to introduce division into the consciousness of Christians 
who owed obedience to both. This interior conflict was contrary to the 
peaceful conscience that the New Testament commended as the condi-
tion in which fo llowers of Christ could conduct their lives of faith under 
God' s supreme authority in Christ, visibly represented by those suc-
ceeding the apostles, while also obeying legitimate po litical authority. 
Pius XII took this a step further by identifying the person as the 
source, agent, and end of all societal processes. This meant, and it was 
carried through most fully in a democratic state, that Church-state rela-
tions were not only for the sake of the people who dutifully received 
decisions made above their heads and then harmonized them. Rather, 
the relations passed thro ugh the people. Ordinary people were involved 
in and were agents in those relations. Murray clarified it as follows: ln 
a democracy the first officer is the c itizen, not the elected o r appointed 
official. The citizen is the state's representative in relating to the 
Church. Who m does that• citizen encounter as representative of the 
Church? That same per on himself or herself as baptized believer, the 
one person who is both believer and citizen is the meeting point. 
A nonestablishment regime does not recognize the religious author-
ity of a bishop, pope, or any Church authority as having j urisdiction 
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over any part of the politica l order. So the conduct of Church-state rela-
tions devolves to the believer/citizen. ln them, in their consciences, 
Church and state meet and seek a harmonious relationship. Conscience 
becomes the meeting hall. The Church represented by the person-as-
believer and the state represented by the person-as-citizen are in contin-
ual , usually quiet session. 
It follows, I suggest, that ecclesiastical authority cannot intervene in 
a Catholic citizen 's conscience by laying upon it a command to perform 
or act on a particular political judgment. That prudential judgment, 
rather, is an irreplaceable function of the believer's own conscience, 
which al so has the obligation to form itself according to Catholic faith 
and morality. To be sure, apostolic authority has every right to fulfill a 
duty to preach and teach the gospel in its implications for public life 
and for the political order of society. This might lead to making public 
judgments on the immorality of specific public policies or their admin-
. istration. That is one thing; it is another thing to try to exercise ecclesi-
astical jurisdiction over the person's polit~cally prudenti al judgment. 
That is, to attempt direct exercise of ecclesiastical authority over some-
thing political in nature, namely, the proper act of an informed citizen. 
That turns the ecclesiastical act into an act of a political nature. No less 
than commanding a government official to repress a heresy, this vio-
lates the hard-won differentiation between the temporal and the spiri-
tual and runs against the spiritual mi ssion of the Church. Equally a 
state, its government and officials have no basis and no authori ty to 
command that an act of religious nature be performed by c itizens, 
whe ther the act be internal like personal prayer or belief that God has 
chosen one 's nation for the mission of spreading democracy, o r exter-
nal-like attendance at worship or professing that the unborn are 
nonhuman. 
Leo Xlll and Murray's fourth principle, of a finality in Church and 
state to a mode of harmony that permits peaceful consciences, does not 
mean peace at any price. Nor does it imply that believers are to treat 
their fai th and their political views as if on par. Nothing sugge ts any-
thing other than that fai th and discipleship are an all-encompassing 
principle of interpretation, not to be subordinated to political convic-
tions. Harmony presupposes and includes the exercise of political pru-
dence and practical reason. So harmony does not result from what some 
seem to think is the proper path- a unilateral, rapidly executed jump 
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from faith to prudential decis'ions on specific laws or pobcies without 
an intervening deliberation. To move from a biblical passage, a tradi-
tional theme, a papal teaching, a personal spirituality to a political deci-
sion without passing through analysis, discussion, reading, and 
reflection precisely on the political level, is to bypass the virtue of pru-
dence, rather than to stand for the demands of faith. This would be prac-
tical fideism. 
Consciences, not legislatures or Vatican halls, are host to the most 
intimate, durable, and influential Church/state relationships. This was 
how Murray envisioned the dignity and role of conscience in regard to 
Church and the political order, not so much as a demand for freedom, 
but as the arena wherein the gospel meets and guides political life. 
Consequently, he placed a good deal of value in Church authorities 
exercising the power of the Church to influence society indirectly by 
helping the faithful to form their consciences in light of Catholic faith 
and morality. Direct influence by means of prelates inserting their in-
fluence into chambers of law above the heads of believer-citizens, or 
seeking to steer democratic processes by commanding a political act, 
runs contrary to the Church/state difference. Strictly speaking, though 
Murray did not draw this conclusion explicitly, it seems that pope, 
bishop, or clergy would have no basis for commanding believers to vote 
this way or that, to take this or that political ac;tion. However, the indi-
rect influence of apostolic authority on society by educative formation 
of consciences is an obligation. Catholics have a correlative duty to 
learn and to act on the implications of their faith for the temporal order 
of society, including its morality. Murray insisted, and took his cue 
from Pope Pius XII on this, that the moral order and legal orders were 
distinct, that the passage from the moral order to the legal order de-
pended greatly on historical, cultural, social context and conditions; 
that social peace was of such value that in a pluralist society, it could 
demand restraint from seeking a direct passage from the moral order to 
the legal order in a given matter. 
It has turned out that practical and theoretical tensions around the 
.. 
second and fourth principles in Catholic Church-state theory have out-
lived M~rray, making him a character in a plot without a climax, resolu-
tion, and denouement. He participated in the larger historical drama 
arising from tensions between Catholicism and American political life. 
His basic position is now less taken for granted as a direction for future 
development, unfortunately. Problems attendant upon some modes of 
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episcopal presence in American public life would have been averted or 
ameliorated were Murray better known to today's prelates. Critiques 
that reject rather than criticize and develop his contribution seem to 
have lo t confidence in the potential for social change in democracy, or 
to have reverted to an Augustinian political theology in the name of 
authentic Catholicity. Whatever the cause, the fact is that Murray's con-
. tribution has not connected with many bishops. Critkal appropriation 
and development of his Church-state thought is needed. 
ln light of a theology of religious pluralism today, it can be added 
that in some analogous way the Church/state difference pertains to and 
supports the spiritual integrity of any religion as well as affirms its inde-
pendence from jurisdiction of any political authority. 
